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The Debate over Parody in Copyright
Law: An Experiment in Cultural
Critique
George E. Marcus
When the cast of Saturday Night Live sang "I Love Sodom" to the
tune of "I Love New York," Elsmere Music, Inc., the copyright proprie-
tor of the tune, "did not see the humor of the sketch."" It took NBC to
court for copyright infringement. This was not a unique case. Motion
picture companies had gone after Jack Benny for his parody of Gaslight
and Sid Caesar for his of From Here to Eternity. Walt Disney sued the
publishers of counterculture comic books and the makers of pornographic
films for the parodic use of characters like Donald Duck and Mickey
Mouse.' The proprietor of the copyright of "Boogie Woogie Bugle Boy"
charged that its copyright was infringed by the composers of "Cunnilingus
Champion of Company C."' The opinions in these cases, and a few others
like them, shape a contemporary legal debate about the nature of parody.
When does parody constitute a valid defense to a charge of copyright in-
fringement? The responses in judicial opinions and scholarly papers pre-
sent a curious paradox. The cases are transparently mundane and the
impetus for the claims is obviously commercial. Indeed, one commentator
noted, "The impact of commercial motivation is heightened by the fact
that in our modern society, the commercial motivation is virtually univer-
sal."' Yet, this recognition appears on the margins of commentary that is
usually couched in language more appropriate to discussions of "high cul-
ture" works of artistic creation.
In assessing the challenging relationship of parody to the idea of copy-
right, judges and academic commentators consider the high-minded pur-
poses of copyright law in the United States, set out in Article I, section 8
of the Constitution-"to promote the progress of science and useful arts
by securing for limited times to authors and inventors the exclusive right
to their respective writings and discoveries." Moreover, they adopt a rhet-
1. Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 482 F. Supp. 741, 745 (S.D.N.Y.), aff d
623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980).
2. Walt Disney Productions v. Mature Pictures Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1397 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
3. MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1981).
4. R.T. Nimmer, "Reflections on the Problem of Parody-Infringement," in ASCAP Copyright
Law Symposium no. 17 (1969), 160.
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oric consistent with this grounding principle that focuses on a mythical
Anglo-American ideal-the virtuous individual author who carries out
acts of independent creative genius and who is motivated, like all self-
interested persons, by the hope of material or financial reward. The clas-
sic humanist view of the artist is only less entrepreneurial. What are we
to make of this gap between a rhetoric of copyright that embraces the
majesty of the artistic creation and the obvious commercial contexts that
have defined case law? Potential answers are located in the realm of mass
consumer culture and the relations between copyright law, commercial
motivation, and the endowment of cultural legitimacy on the products of
mass culture.
To an ethnographer whose project is to represent the style, logic, and
ideological salience of different kinds of cultural discourses in modern so-
cieties, the scope of the legal debate about parody and, in turn, about the
nature of copyright in its historic and social context is disappointing. For,
far from regarding parody as only a traditional category or subgenre of
literature, contemporary cultural theorists conceive of it as a self-conscious
aesthetic of everyday life and a major mode or style of communication that
is particularly suited to the "postmodernist" conditions of western societies
in the late twentieth century.' American legal discourse, by favoring au-
thorial privilege over a rigid control of ideas or their expression, does take
a liberal view of parody and copyright. Nonetheless, it retains a reverent
conception of authorship that treats it as a timeless and natural category
of social identity. But in fact, the law's sense of what constitutes an author
reflects eighteenth, nineteenth, and early twentieth century bourgeois no-
tions of artistic production.
This anachronism is not surprising. Spheres of the law like copyright
tend toward conservatism. They build upon a tradition that is relatively
insulated from and insensitive to changes in social trends, and operate
within the confines of their particular cumulative textual pasts. Legal dis-
course translates the social world into a language that serves its own pur-
poses of resolving conflict and of flexibly providing solutions to problems
that have traditionally been framed in its terms. When it undertakes this
translation, copyright addresses communicational processes that are perva-
sive and offers privileges that can be claimed and to which the law will
respond. For example, great contemporary challenges to the conservation
of legal discourse in copyright concern computer software and satellite
communications. Parody, as a mode of common or more specialized com-
munication in different domains of social life, has little or no relevance for
legal discourse until it is invoked as a defense against a charge of copy-
right infringement. It so happens that all of the cases concern the contem-
5. See, for instance, Margaret A. Rose, Parody/Meta-Fiction (1979) and "Parody/Post-Modern-
ism," Poetics 17 (1988): 49.
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porary culture industry, where parody, if not piracy, is perceived as a
direct affront to the market value of a particular copyrighted expression of
an idea.
Notwithstanding the narrowness of its textual tradition, the principled
discourse that accompanies the resolution of particular parody cases often
attempts to take a broader view. But even as it does so, the discourse
constricts itself by adopting idealized and decontextualized conceptions of
the artist and the work of art. The law cannot capture emergent forms,
but tries to manage the new by making old concepts encompass broader
categories-eventually drawing in improvised music and photographs, for
instance-which will still provide leeway for social policy considerations
in judicial opinions and scholarly commentary. The problem is that,
where parody and the opinions and scholarship that cover it are con-
cerned, legal discourse has failed to go beyond a very limited vision of the
artist and work of art.
This essay is an attempt to elaborate on legal discourse concerning the
parody defense by juxtaposing it to readings from two diverse domains of
cultural analysis. In this manner, I hope to illuminate some themes and
problems that legal discourse has understated or left unstated. I do not
intend, however, to resolve the question of the relation of parody and
copyright in a manner that will be of practical interest to lawyers, in the
sense of offering legal solutions to legal questions. Rather, by working
outside the traditional frame of reference of legal discussions about copy-
right, I feel free to encompass the legal within the social rather than vice
versa. Imaginative readings of the purpose of copyright and the parody
defense are, for me, exercises in ideology critique that are worthwhile in
themselves. This essay suggests an approach to ideology critique from the
perspective of recent reexaminations of ethnography. I have been develop-
ing a critique which brings together disseminated and disseminating cul-
tural ideologies across a diversity of social contexts. For example, there
are a number of ways that the formation of intellectual property law can
and should be read outside its own frame of reference. By a strategy of
"reading against" (against the so-called "primitive" and "postmodern" in
this essay), copyright becomes a subject of sustained defamiliarization that
engages the assumptions or aspects of a particular discourse that are usu-
ally masked or submerged. This strategy leads to a form of critical essay
that plays on juxtaposed cross readings, the confrontations of diverse con-
texts, while maintaining an ethnographic sensitivity for the integrity of
context.6 Thus, while this essay may not resolve the problems that the
6. I and several other colleagues have been engaged recently in a critique of ethnographic method
and writing within anthropology. See James Clifford and George E. Marcus, eds., Writing Culture:
The Politics and Poetics of Ethnography (1986), and George E. Marcus and Michael M.J. Fischer,
Anthropology as Cultural Critique: An Experimental Moment in the Human Sciences (1986). In this
effort, there has been a search for new uses and different objects for ethnographic inquiry. The essen-
1989]
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parody defense raises for judges and lawyers, it might make the principled
legal discourse more richly evocative of the broader context of cultural
predicament with which this discourse, in fact, deals.
THE WORK OF ART AS GIFT IN THE AGE OF COPYRIGHT
Since the enactment of the first English Copyright Act, the Statute of
Anne of 1709, the basic tension in Anglo-American copyright law has
pitted the author's interest, embodied in the grant of an "exclusive right"
to authors as an economic incentive to share their work, against a broader
social interest in the promotion of free competition, freedom of speech and
freedom of expression.' Both the Statute of Anne and the first United
States federal copyright act, enacted in 1791, included sections that stated
the purpose of the legislation. However, when the statutes governing
copyright were revised in 1831, the statement of "purpose" was removed.
Since then, the purpose of copyright has been a constant issue in judicial
opinions and in scholarly commentary, subject to varied constructions in
the fashioning of legislation.'
While one might expect comment on the purpose of copyright to evoke
a deeply American cultural view of the processes of artistic (or scientific)
creation, or perhaps an awareness of how the product of artistic labor has
been alienated, contemporary legal discourse is descriptively thin in its
hallowing of the artist or author. Rarely since the antebellum era, when
an intimate connection between law and letters existed,9 have writers of
tial milieu for this project has been the emergent interdisciplinary space of cultural studies; its motiva-
tion stems from a renewed interest in the critique of social practices and discourses, and blurring of
the boundaries of disciplines such as anthropology, sociology, literary studies, history, and philosophy.
My special interest in the law began in graduate school with a once-lively arena of anthropological
research on cross-cultural conflict management. It then moved to critical legal studies, which seemed
attractive since its concern with ideology critique, while classically focused on texts, seemed to be
grounded in a sensitivity to the social contexts of legal practice and discourse that resembled an eth-
nographer's concern. This movement has produced some stirring theoretical insights, a compelling
vision of what significant research into the law might be, and some excellent history. But the quality
of the actual critiques of contemporary legal institutions, especially in relation to society, has been
mixed. This essay emerges from this context. Ironically, my strategy of critique through cross-reading
plays with the practices of imitation and parody-for-critical-effect that copyright law never seems to
recognize explicitly as a major habit or fashion of contemporary communication. Rather, copyright
law merely defines "the social" as background for the cases and policies which it considers. But the
law is an inherent part of this "social" in that it plays some of the same language games, however
irrelevant or obstructive to its purposes a recognition of this might be.
7. Leon E. Seltzer, Exemptions and Fair Use in Copyright: The Exclusive Rights Tensions in the
1976 Copyright Act (1978).
8. Five states passed copyright statutes between 1783 and 1786, on the urging of the Continental
Congress. Property in copyright was eventually created by federal statute in the power that the Con-
stitution vested in Congress (Article I, section 8). In the twentieth century, the act of 1909 governed
copyright until the revision of 1976, which was striking in its explicit and detailed treatment of ex-
emptions from copyright control that had previously been developed in case law only. There was
something patrician about the privilege granted the author that had always rankled the balancing
democratic side of copyright. Finally, in 1976, this side came into its own in the detailed statutory
concerns with fair use and exemption.
9. Robert A. Ferguson, Law and Letters in American Culture (1984).
[Vol. 1: 295
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legal opinion or scholarship in the United States felt free to indulge their
cultural imaginations (or class interests). Indeed, in the late twentieth cen-
tury, legal discourse about copyright has come to be constrained by a for-
mulaic language of economic justice and liberal social policy standards
that are typically stated in vague pronouncements about the rights of indi-
viduals in relation to the broader social good. Modern copyright law has
left the determination of infringement to judges who make their decisions
on a case by case basis and use an intentionally vague rhetoric of balanc-
ing the author's versus society's interest in their framing of copyright's
purpose. Moreover, there has been a distinct trend in the twentieth cen-
tury of recognizing and expanding exemptions to copyright. This can be
read as a certain realism on the judge's part regarding the monopoly im-
plications of copyright in an economy where it is widely understood that
the rights and privileges extending from the copyright are most conse-
quentially corporate, rather than the individual artist's. I will address this
shortly. This section presents an elaboration of the ideology of copyright
that passes through an important literature in anthropology (carrying its
own ideological implication) with the aim of restating the basic tension in
copyright law in a more densely imagined, cultural context.
Of course, the vague rhetorical framework within which lawyers dis-
cuss the purposes of copyright does not license just any cultural reading.
There are a number of different conceptualizations of copyright's pur-
poses within legal discourse. One of these will serve as my starting point.
In an excellent, but now little cited compendium on American copyright
law, Ralph Shaw provides a suggestive account of the nature and purpose
of copyright.10 Under the common law, an author has an automatic right
to control the use and reproduction of his or her unpublished work. It is
absolute personal property. With regard to published work, statutory
schemes give authors the same kind of right but limit its duration. Fur-
thermore, they require that a copyright be formally applied for or de-
clared. Shaw argues that statutory copyright is less a right than a privi-
lege or franchise granted in return for, and to induce, some social or
public act by the author or artist. As Shaw paraphrases legal opinion:
There is an important distinction between copyrights and patents.
Letters patent give a monopoly to make, vend, and use, while copy-
right does not give an exclusive right to use. Copyright protection is
extended to authors mainly with a view to inducing them to give
their ideas to the public so that they may be added to the intellectual
store, accessible to the people, and that they may be used for the
intellectual advancement of mankind. . . . [C]opyright is a franchise
10. Ralph R. Shaw, Literary Property in the United States (1950), 29-32. Shaw's treatise focuses
on literary property and is primarily concerned with cases decided under the Copyright Act, ch. 320,
35 Stat. 1075 (1909).
1989]
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granted in the public interest, and the object is to advance the arts
and sciences by encouraging the dissemination of materials which
might otherwise be withheld.11
In other words, Shaw's interpretation of the purpose of copyright is not as
an economic incentive to get artists to produce, as some have argued, but
rather as an inducement to get them to give their work to society in gen-
eral, that is, to make a gift. 2
The idea of the work of art as gift is a recurrent one in romantic, high
cultural discourse. It has most recently been reiterated in Lewis Hyde's
The Gift: Imagination and the Erotic Life of Property. Through much of
his book, Hyde ignores the commercial or exchange element of gift-giving
so that he can sharply distinguish gifts from commodities. He briefly con-
fronts it only in his conclusion where he resigns himself to the need for
artists as gift-givers to reconcile themselves to participation in a thor-
oughly market society and the inevitable commodification of their cre-
ations. In other words, Hyde is concerned almost exclusively with the art-
ist's act of giving and not with the return or expectation of return that
completes and makes social the act of giving. The following provides a
sense of Hyde's sacralizing tone-the gift is that part of the object which
makes it true art, which makes it resist engulfment by market exchange:
If a work of art is the emanation of its maker's gift and if it is re-
ceived by its audience as a gift, then is it, too, a gift? I have framed
the question to imply an affirmative answer, but I doubt we can be
so categorical. Any object, any item of commerce, becomes one kind
of property or another depending on how we use it. . . . For exam-
ple, religions often prohibit the sale of sacred objects, the implication
being that their sanctity is lost if they are bought and sold. A work
of art seems to be a hardier breed; it can be sold in the market and
still emerge a work of art. But if it is true that in the essential com-
merce of art a gift is carried by the work from the artist to his audi-
ence, if I am right to say where there is no gift there is no art, then
it may be possible to destroy a work of art by converting it into a
pure commodity. Such, at any rate, is my position. I do not maintain
that art cannot be bought and sold; I do maintain that the gift por-
tion of the work places a constraint upon our merchandising."
The lofty heights of Hyde's haute bourgeoisie nostalgia for the aura of
the work of art appear to be quite distant from the mundane, dull, and
11. Shaw, Literary Property in the United States, 34-35. Italics mine.
12. That this may seem a sociologically simplistic notion about what motivates authors to publish
their work as well as a cynical idea about the state of gift-giving in modern society may just be a
function of the limited cultural vocabulary that decontextualizing, principle-seeking legal discourse
has imposed on itself. For in legal discourse, financial gain, which stands for the complexity of moti-
vation, is the universal motor of individual behavior under a market regime.
13. Lewis Hyde, The Gift: Imagination and the Erotic Life of Property (1983), xii-xiii.
[Vol. 1: 295
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crass provisions of copyright law. Nothing of the gift dimension of artistic
activity seems to be retained as these provisions become merely the means
by which the artist's gift devolves into a commodity. Perhaps, but the at-
tempt to lend cultural substance to the ideology of copyright is an interest-
ing arena for exploring the ambiguous survival of a pure high cultural
ideology of gift exchange that acts authoritatively as law upon the opera-
tions of a clearly dominant regime of commodification. The high cultural
ideology within the law of copyright is as resolute as Hyde's. It is only
more hesitant in expressing itself. The veiled issue with which parody
confronts copyright law concerns the fate of an ideology of artistic prop-
erty defined through gift-giving in a world that is dominated by exchange
of commodities.
For my purposes, it is particularly interesting that Hyde's formulation
of artistic endeavor as gift-giving draws on the important anthropological
literature that has grown out of Marcel Mauss's classic comparative
study, The Gift: Forms and Functions of Exchange in Archaic Societies.
In anthropology, Mauss's essay has been of seminal importance in provid-
ing a framework for describing social relations and cultural structures that
ethnographers encounter in the so-called "primitive" or tribal societies
that they have traditionally studied. In this essay, I am less interested in
the development of this literature toward more complex and sophisticated
understandings of systems of reciprocity and exchange in (non-capitalist)
market societies than in its ideological import for certain arguments
within Western, particularly American, society.
Although Mauss himself mentions a number of contexts in industrial,
market societies in which a regime of gift exchange survives,14 in their
studies of non-Western peoples, anthropologists have almost exclusively
emphasized the contrasting, difference-marking functions of the "moral
economy" of the gift in opposition to the "soul-less," commodifying econo-
mies of the market societies from which they come.15 Regimes of exchange
grounded in the moral economy of the gift show that alternatives to com-
modity exchange exist. This demonstration and its potential critique of
Western Market Man constitute a significant subtext of the anthropologi-
cal literature, sometimes brought to the surface by different writers.
Within the realm of diverse Western discourses, then, anthropology pro-
vides an explicit, semi-utopian ideological statement, based on its authori-
14. Mauss numbered intellectual property law among the contexts in which the gift regime sur-
vived. M. Mauss, The Gift (1967), 64-65. But the French copyright law to which Mauss may have
referred is very different from Anglo-American copyright law. It appears to be more expressive of
cultural values and aesthetic debates. Artists' reactions to copyright statutes in late-nineteenth and
early-twentieth century France are discussed in an interesting paper by Molly Nesbit, "What Was an
Author?" Yale French Studies 73 (1987): 229-257.
15. Sociologists have generally been more interested than anthropologists in locating and discuss-
ing the fate of gift regimes in modern societies. See especially the highly regarded comparative study
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tative contemplation of distinctly other human worlds, that makes com-
mon cause with a variety of critiques of life in the West. In this sense,
Hyde uses the anthropological literature as an authority and grand meta-
phor to give cultural body to his own nostalgic ideas about the sacredness
of the work of art as gift in modernity.
I will treat the same literature but try to extract from it a framework
that helps pose questions about the view of art as gift in the context of
legal discourse on copyright. Unlike Hyde, I do not assume that this liter-
ature is authoritative or that it transparently represents the social prac-
tices of the societies with which it is concerned. It is a discourse which is
as much a product of Western culture as Hyde's exercise in aesthetics or
the law of copyright. In fact, the gradual development of a self-conscious
recognition of their own interpretive biases among anthropologists who
have produced this literature has been responsible for much of the pro-
gress that they have made in working with a long history of fieldwork
observations and indigenous commentaries on gift exchange.
The accumulated corpus of anthropological commentary on key indige-
nous testimonies about the meaning of gift exchange in particular "primi-
tive" societies offers an illuminating surrogate discourse that makes ex-
plicit an essentially parallel conception in copyright that legal discourse
has not really articulated. I want to recast the gift rationale of copyright
in terms borrowed from a non-Western text to which anthropologists from
Mauss to the present have returned in their attempts to construct a theory
or ideology of gift exchange, a statement by the Maori, Tamati Ranapiri:
I will carefully explain to you. Suppose you possess a certain article,
and you give that article to me without price. We make no bargain
over it. Now, I give that article to a third person, who, after some
time has elapsed, decides to make some return for it, and so he
makes me a present of some article. Now, that article that he gives
me is the hau of the article I first received from you and then gave to
him. The goods that I received for that item I must hand over to
you. It would not be right for me to keep such goods for myself,
whether they be desirable items or otherwise. I must hand them over
to you, because they are a hau of the article you gave me. Were I to
keep such an equivalent for myself, then some serious evil would
befall me, even death.16
At first sight it might seem exotic to conceptualize American law in
terms of the words and thoughts of a commentator apparently so distant
in cultural time and space from ourselves. The rationale of Western copy-
right in Maori terms may not seem to be so exotic, however, when one
appreciates the line of connections among the mediating representations,
16. Translation of a response by Tamati Ranapiri to the ethnographer Elsdon Best in 1909;
quoted in Marshall Sahlins, "The Spirit of the Gift," in Stone Age Economics (1972), 151.
[Vol. 1: 295
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from the anthropologist in the field in search of "authentic" indigenous
texts to the generations of theoretical commentary and scholarly debate
about the nature of the "Other" that such texts are made to reveal, to
aesthetic theorists who take this "real" provided by anthropology to fur-
ther their own representations of an "ideal," and finally, to the incorpora-
tion of such ideas of the "ideal" into the rationales and ideologies of oper-
ating, authoritative institutions like law that subsume social and cultural
spheres.
A key problem in anthropology has been how to talk about the "spirit
of the gift," the Maori hau, which motivates the return and keeps the
moral economy of exchange going. Tamati Ranapiri's explanation has
served as textual source through which a number of analysts, including
Mauss, have attempted to explain the mystical force that surrounds gift
exchange and ensures a return to the giver. Like most members of secu-
larized Western societies, anthropologists do not have much of a vocabu-
lary for elaborating this sacred or mystical force. Thus, the character of
this force remains merely attributed or intractably mystified. Unfortu-
nately, it is precisely this aspect of the gift literature that Hyde draws on
to lend substance and authority to his attempt to rescue the aura of works
of art in late capitalism. As a result, Hyde offers an earnest imputation of
the sacredness of art as gift, but little in-depth analysis.
As I am concerned with the very rational and secular discourse of copy-
right, it seems only appropriate to draw on anthropological commentary
that takes a more pragmatic, materialist view of gift exchange in tradi-
tional societies. Marshall Sahlins' essay, "The Spirit of the Gift," is per-
haps the most famous interpretation in this vein." In fact, Hyde made
extensive use of Sahlins' work. However, this essay places less emphasis
on what is, in Western terms, the "unspeakable" side of gift ex-
change-its mystical force-than on its pragmatic, easily recognizable eco-
nomic logic. Criticizing Mauss's interpretation of Tamati Ranapiri's ex-
planation of gift exchange, Sahlins writes:
Still, to adopt the current structuralist incantation, "everything hap-
pens as if" the Maori was trying to explain a religious concept by an
economic principle, which Mauss promptly understood the other
way around and thereupon proceeded to develop the economic prin-
ciple by the religious concept. . ... 8
For Sahlins, the key to understanding the hau of the gift, the compulsion
to make a return on the original gift, involves a three-party model (as in
the Maori sage's testimony): A gives to B, B passes on to C, C makes a
return prestation to B, and B must give back to A, the originator of the
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gift, what C gave to him. In this illustration, there is a defining moral
principle that distinguishes such gift regimes from Western economic
logic. Sahlins explains:
The meaning of hau one disengages from the exchange of taonga is
as secular as the exchange itself. If the second gift is the hau of the
first, then the hau of a good is its yield, just as the hau of a forest is
its productiveness. Actually, to suppose Tamati Ranapiri meant to
say the gift has a spirit which forces repayment seems to slight the
old gentleman's obvious intelligence. To illustrate, such a spirit
needs only a game of two persons: you give something to me, your
spirit (hau) in the thing obliges me to reciprocate. Simple enough.
The introduction of a third party could only unduly complicate and
obscure the point. But if the point is neither spiritual nor reciprocity
as such, if it is rather that one man's gift should not be another
man's capital, and therefore the fruits of a gift ought to be passed
back to the original holder, then the introduction of a third party is
necessary. It is necessary precisely to show a turnover; the gift has
had issue; the recipient has used it to advantage ... "
Sahlins goes on to absorb more "exotic" practices like sorcery and hunt-
ing/fertility rituals into this model. While the model, derived from Ta-
mati Ranapiri's authoritative explanation, claims to represent a more gen-
eral indigenous logic of socio-economic relationships that differ from that
in the West, the terms are still ours. They are essentially individualistic
and describe what would otherwise be a self-interested economic transac-
tion. But they also give it a moral twist that is in line with the ethic of
virtue anthropologists impute to societies that antedate or exist outside of
the market regime. If Sahlins' description, that of the West, is merely an
elaboration of Tamati Ranapiri's, that of the Other, how are we to take
the latter's? In the specific ethnographic setting, the sage was trying to
make Elsdon Best (the anthropologist who recorded the comment) under-
stand gift exchange in Best's terms, and not necessarily in his own terms.
The year was 1909, nearly a century after Europeans had become firmly
established in New Zealand. There is little doubt that Tamati Ranapiri
was being a good instructor and cultural translator, couching Maori
knowledge in the idiom of the Other, the European, to whom he was
addressing his explanation in the role of "anthropological informant" and
in response to elicitation. Sahlins perhaps takes Ranapiri's explanation too
closely as the voice of the Maori point of view unmediated by the intercul-
tural situation in which it occurred.20
19. Ibid., 160. My italics.
20. In yet another brilliant and very recent reinterpretation of the famous explanation by Tamati
Ranapiri, Annette Weiner, "Inalienable Wealth," American Ethnologist 12 (No. 2, 1985): 210-227,
constructs a completely different context for understanding Maori (and more generally, traditional)
exchange by focusing on the rich and complex cultural associations of the goods exchanged themselves,
[Vol. 1: 295
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Sahlins' essay, nonetheless, is one of the clearest and most usable state-
ments of the counter-ideology of the gift since Mauss. It criticizes the
Western market mentality by elaborating a substantive alternative that is
certainly of the Other, but that is not so different that the economic frame
of reference and target of the critique is lost. It exemplifies the subtextual
dimension of anthropological writing which in contemplation of the Other
has the purpose of offering a commentary on ourselves. Sahlins' (and Ta-
mati Ranapiri's) explanation of the hau is thus eminently usable by Hyde
for his purposes and me for mine. I use it as a way to extend further a
cultural reading of copyright's constricted expression of its high culture
ideology which regards works of art as a special sort of property in West-
ern market economies and which gives copyright its purpose. That is,
copyright is in some sense the hau of works of art. But in what sense?
Instead of person-to-person exchange and the compulsion to return sa-
cred property, we have the artist making a gift of his or her work to
society at large, or more specifically, to a world of business and commerce.
The hau of the work of art is what copyright guarantees the artist or
original donor in an anonymous world of apparently autonomous markets
and processes of mass production. But while it subscribes to the idea that
"cone man's gift should not be another man's capital," copyright ideology
is undermined when it confronts the overwhelming number of situations
in contemporary society where a corporation acquires an author's copy-
right in return for a salary or royalties. The term "author" in the copy-
right literature is blurred and stands for either the individual author or
the owner of the copyright (usually a corporation or publisher in the par-
ody defense context). This permits a principled, high-toned ideology of
purpose-that of the morality of the hau transmogrified for moder-
nity-to be sustained in the face of contradictory practice, where indeed
one man's gift regularly becomes another man's capital."1
One might see in this a different, more socially and culturally embed-
ded statement of the basic tension within copyright law. It is not merely
that is the taonga such as greenstone, cloth, etc., rather than on the hau, or return yield, of giving,
which is a much more Western concern in terms of the framework that Sahlins and others have
employed. She thus reveals a very different world and set of terms of references in which gift ex-
change must be understood. The framework of understanding seems very alien indeed to ours, espe-
cially to the economic frame of reference that we privilege to pose and solve so many contemporary
social problems, in contrast to the one Sahlins uses, and it is generally less assimilable than his to the
idea of the gift as an inherently economic transaction.
21. The bias, of course, in the anthropological literature has been to reinforce those who have
wanted to contrast, for purposes of critique, gift systems with commodity ones, despite Mauss himself
recognizing the survival of gift regimes in capitalist societies (but as survivals, he seems to be indicat-
ing that the gift regime is residual, marginal, and essentially alien to modernity). Recently, there has
been a sophisticated and therapeutic blurring of this habit of contrast in the collection of essays edited
by Arjun Appadurai, The Social Life of Things (1986). The commodity and gift are different stages
or identities of objects as they circulate in all kinds of societies, and to see this clearly, it is the politics
of valuation that must be understood as objects pass through diverse regimes where they acquire use
and exchange value of different sorts.
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the author's interest in financial gain opposed to society's interest in free-
dom of speech and expression. Rather, the alternative modes of exchange
or dissemination of the work of art are in tension. What copyright ideo-
logically conceptualizes as a gift, the author's control over reproduction of
his creation (replacing the hau) and ensuring a financial return on all
authorized uses (or givings) of the work, becomes in corporate hands a
commodity, an exclusive object whose value resides in its marketability,
and restricted in its dissemination to enhance its value. The gift-becoming-
commodity is the crucial tension that copyright ideology fails to address.
This restatement in anthropological terms of the rationale of copyright
sets the stage for a discussion of the specific problem of parody, first in the
legal terms in which it has been debated, and then read against alternative
views of the status of parody in contemporary aesthetic theory and cul-
tural criticism. In the final section we will draw together these two cultur-
ally elaborated restatements of copyright law: (1) copyright as rooted in a
high culture rationale linked to a notion of the work of art as gift; and (2)
parody on a broader canvas as a major and pervasive mode of social
communication.
THE LEGAL TERMS OF DEBATE OVER PARODY AS A DEFENSE
AGAINST COPYRIGHT INFRINGEMENT
I now want to review how the problem of parody has been defined and
debated in legal discourse.' Parody, offered as a defense against a charge
of copyright infringement, has depended on claiming an exemption based
on "fair use." Fair use is a familiar concept as old as copyright itself that
only became a matter of statutory law with the enactment of the revised
Copyright Act of 1976.2" The act explicitly set out four criteria for ana-
lyzing fair use which had emerged previously in the case law:24
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such
use is of a commercial nature or is for non-profit educational
purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
22. I see no need to rehearse here what has been extensively discussed before: the inconsistencies
and confusions in the corpus of parody cases since the 1950s. There is a medium-sized law journal
literature that does this. The three most recent and synoptic sources, Richard A. Bernstein, "Parody
and Fair Use," in ASCAP Copyright Law Symposium no. 31 (1984), Julie Bisceglia, "Parody and
Copyright Protection: Turning the Balancing Act into the Juggling Act," in ASCAP Copyright Law
Symposium no. 34 (1987), and Melanie A. Clemmons, "Author v. Parodist: Striking a Compromise,"
in ASCAP Copyright Law Symposium no. 33 (1987), on which I will be focusing in this article,
exhaustively list and treat this literature, and they should be consulted for full references (e.g., see
Clemmons, 91 nn. 28, 29).
23. This indicates perhaps that with its general emphasis on exemptions, see Seltzer, Exemptions
and Fair Use in Copyright, the law was leaning in the traditional balance more toward the social
good, e.g., the value on freedom of information, than toward the author's benefit. (The "author" is, in
fact, usually the corporate owner of intellectual property.)
24. Bernstein, "Parody and Fair Use," 10.
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(3) the amount of substantiality of the portion used in relation to
the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of
the copyrighted work.
The third and fourth criteria have been most important in deciding the
parody cases. Substantiality, a common criterion in the early cases of the
1950s, is a very literal means of handling the question of parody, espe-
cially when it is only the quantity rather than the quality of borrowing
that has been considered. The economic consequence criterion establishes
a broad boundary principle that avoids having to otherwise specify or de-
fine the relation of the parody to the original, and tends to be the criterion
used by those who want to construct fair use more liberally. The first two
criteria have revealed more open attitudes about parody as a form of ex-
pression. Opinion on parody ranges from its association with burlesque
(thus giving a low value to its social importance) to its standing as a major
form of social criticism (in which it has a high culture association as art).
Each of these criteria implies that parody is secondary to or derivative of
an original work, that is, a copy.
Recent attempts to order the morass of inconsistencies in copyright law
reveal the inhibition that the purposes and traditions of legal writing place
on our understanding of the problem of copyright and parody. This is
most striking in three prize winning papers from the annual Nathan Bur-
kan Memorial Competition, sponsored by ASCAP (the American Society
of Composers, Authors, and Publishers) and published in the annual
Copyright Law Symposium. All three concern the parody defense and
make ambitious proposals to put this body of law in order; two of the
three do so by definitional exercises that rely on a statement of the nature
of parody carefully designed to avoid the problems of the past; the third
sees the wisdom of not trying to distinguish parody at all in relation to a
work parodied. Finally, all the papers would like legal discourse to incor-
porate a culturally richer notion of parody as a style of communication in
the arts and society. The three papers attempt in their own ways to pro-
vide this type of analysis, but they remain limited by traditions of legal
writing, which in these instances seem to be to solve specific problems of
the legal construction of principle from case law.
I want to extend the discussion of the three papers beyond their own
unfulfilled inclination, which is to relate the legal consideration of parody
to how it is practiced and thought about in society as a special form of
communication. To do so, I will briefly characterize the main arguments
of the papers and then place them against two alternative understandings
of parody that view it as a distinguishing feature of the conditions that
define postmodernism in contemporary mass media, consumer society.
Richard Bernstein's scheme envisions a quite lenient general theory of
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fair use, to be applied to all secondary uses of original works, even when
the use is substantial. He recognizes that in past cases the secondary
work's economic effect on the original has been either decisive or very
significant. He objects, however, that not enough attention has been paid
to the independent value of promoting parody or other kinds of secondary
work. He finally outlines a proposed fair use standard in which, even if
the defendant's copy does decrease the demand for a plaintiff's work, it
would still be permitted if the benefit that the secondary use gives to the
promotion of artistic achievement outweighs the damage done to the origi-
nal author's monopoly interest. Bernstein also seeks to leap over the lit-
eral-minded substantiality criterion (the so called "conjuring up" princi-
ple, permitting the parodist only enough copying necessary to recall or
conjure up the original). Instead, he advocates permitting any use that can
be seen to promote the arts. If there is any originality at all in the second-
ary work, then it should be Permitted as a fair use, even if it is to the
economic detriment of the original work limited to some threshold. Fi-
nally, Bernstein would do away with the distinction between original and
secondary works based on assumptions of relative artistic value.
An unstated assumption about the conditions of artistic production and
communication in modern society lies behind this liberalizing approach.
Bernstein seems to favor the relative artistic worth of parody, or the copy,
which is usually the underdog, so to speak, in a discourse that uses the
high culture notion of individually inspired and created works of art to
determine what copyright is designed to privilege and protect.25
Julie Bisceglia's proposed scheme also tries to transcend the literal-
minded criteria employed in analyzing parody cases and the resulting his-
tory of inconsistencies. Her solution, however, builds on a definition of
parody derived from literary authority. She begins with a typology of five
distinct kinds of literary parody, and suggests that the determination of
liability should turn on identifying the use the parody makes of the source
text and the target of criticism. Parody, she argues, "focusses attention on
both the style and substance of a source text and uses comic techniques,
such as exaggeration and incongruity, to criticize the source text." 6 That
is, a parody must establish a close relationship, engagement, even dialogue
with its source. It cannot loosely evoke or imitate the source expression for
some other purpose or target of criticism. Such a work of parody, tightly
connected to its source, is protected without recourse to fair use or free
speech, Bisceglia claims, but instead is protected by the Constitutional
copyright clause (the same absolute authority claimed by Bernstein). Bis-
ceglia, even more than Bernstein, seems to have a very high regard for
25. Bernstein, "Parody and Fair Use."
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parody as a style of communication, and for the creative and progressive
value of critical activity generally.
Melanie Clemmons provides a detailed treatment of the competing in-
terests of the original author and the parodist that attempts to define stan-
dards of compromise. She recognizes that the courts have been reluctant to
treat parody as a copyright infringement, whereas she begins with a posi-
tion that diminishes a notion that parody is a natural or a priori candi-
date for fair use consideration. The courts, she notes, have tended to ig-
nore altogether the issue of consent to parody, which is part of the
copyright privilege. Having framed the question in these terms, Clem-
mons not surprisingly tends to restore the balance in favor of the author
and the privileges that have been granted her. She defines parody as a
derivative work that is clearly independent from the original work of
authorship:
A parody is a work that transforms all or a significant part of an
original work of authorship into a derivative work by distorting it or
closely imitating it, for comic effect, in a manner such that both the
original work of authorship and the independent effort of the paro-
dist are recognizable.2 7
Clemmons argues that the author of a parodied work should expect finan-
cial gains from the parodist, if the latter benefits. Parody, not coming
under fair use, should be subject to some sort of licensing, or at least the
payment of royalties to the author of the original work. Reasonable royal-
ties are designed to ensure that when commercially successful parodies are
created from less profitable original works, the authors of the original
works will share in the financial rewards of the parodists. Clearly, Clem-
mons' scheme in its effort to seek a balance between competing interests is
biased in favor of the original work of art and considerably tames the
critical power and spontaneity of parody by insisting that "the parodist
should be formally obliged to deal with the author before asking the court
to provide shelter within the fair use doctrine." 28
Even as they attempt to move beyond the inconsistencies of legal opin-
ion in the parody cases and stretch the limits of convention, the papers
adhere to established rhetoric of the primacy of high culture in copyright
discussions. Before passing on to contextualize these commentaries in
modernist debates, we should note the ways that they sustain the high
culture ideal despite their best intentions:
(1) None of the papers really focuses on the fact that, whatever the
general principles involved might be for future cases, to date, all of the
parody cases have developed in the mass media realm of the culture indus-
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try. The 1950s cases against Jack Benny and Sid Caesar, for instance,
were obviously motivated in part by the movie industry's perception of
threat from the rise of television. The issue of parody is thus very much
embedded in technologies other than print. Indeed, the fair use reproduc-
tion of images, including for the explicit purpose of parody, is so pervasive
in mass media and photographic works of art that specific efforts to claim
copyright infringement, while sanctioned by law, seem arbitrary.29 Parody
is a kind of fair use that, by its critical bite, is more likely to provoke and
bring upon itself a charge of infringement. If all the possible charges that
could be brought by those who hold copyright were brought, processes of
communication would be disrupted on such a scale as to call into question
the existence of and rationale for copyright itself. Instead, it would seem
that copyright cases are mostly contained by the commercial interest in
creative works as commodities, which seems to stimulate most charges of
infringement.
(2) The papers follow the standard practice in copyright literature of
using the generic term "author" to stand for either the individual author
or the usually corporate proprietor of the copyright, but with the former
rather than the latter as the main referent. In sociological terms, it makes
all the difference to collapse the referents under a single term in this way,
although perhaps not for the purposes and problems of legal discourse.
Even Clemmons, who focuses on the relationship between the author and
parodist, fails to pay attention to the very different kinds of social refer-
ents these labels may have in specific instances.
(3) When these commentators try to probe the nature of parody beyond
the common sense meanings given to it in opinions and commentaries,
they rely exclusively on formal literary treatments and authorities. They
thus never get beyond parody in the tradition of (print) "literature" as
such. But, as was noted above, this is not where the cases have been devel-
oped, and as we will see, it is not where parody has developed as an
important contemporary aesthetic.
All the papers thus, through these conformities with established rhetori-
cal practices, adhere to the high culture ideal referent of copyright discus-
sions, even while they are trying to stretch the limits of such practices to
move beyond the inconsistencies of legal opinion in the parody cases to a
higher, more encompassing level of reason. We must place the schemes
offered in the papers against parody conceived as a pervasive style of com-
munication and a vehicle of contemporary modernist aesthetics outside
29. See the collection of essays edited by John Shelton Lawrence and Bernard Timberg, Fair Use
And Free Inquiry: Copyright Law and the New Media (1980). The authors noted that they had
difficulty getting some people to contribute to their collection, and in one case they received the follow-
ing reason (p. xiv):
I honestly don't believe that I would want to make a public statement. It's not cowardice so
much as a belief that if no one says anything about these matters, we can continue to proceed
unimpeded for an indefinite period of time.
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law and literature before we can appreciate the limits of their own efforts
at critique.
Two POSITIONS ON THE PRACTICE OF PARODY IN LATE (POST?)
MODERNIST 0 DEBATES
In examining the role of parody in modernist debates, one cannot as
easily put one's faith in definitional exercises as in the legal debates which
look to the authority of literature to conceptualize parody by classifying it
in terms of genre or subgenre. Indeed, modernist views of parody reject
and oppose classifying schemes that formally limit the concept to litera-
ture. They develop a notion of parody by envisioning a grand problematic
of communication, language, and image in late twentieth century society.
In this conception, parody is either a distinguishing symptom or an effec-
tive critical response. For late and postmodernists, a form of expression
like parody spills over the bounds of literature and literary creation into
other media and the cognition of everyday life; art and life, high and pop-
ular culture, are merged in complex ways.
Perhaps the most influential contemporary statement about parody
which concerns its degeneration into pastiche is that of Fredric Jameson.",
It is worth quoting at length these essential passages from his 1983 essay
"Postmodernism and Consumer Society":
Pastiche is, like parody, the imitation of a peculiar or unique style,
the wearing of a stylistic mask, speech in a dead language: but it is a
neutral practice of such mimicry, without parody's ulterior motive,
without the satirical impulse, without laughter, without that still la-
tent feeling that there exists something normal compared to which
what is being imitated is rather comic. Pastiche is blank parody, par-
ody that has lost its sense of humor ...
30. 1 use the designation Late (Post?) Modern to mark the uncertainty surrounding the current
debates that seek to define postmodernism and assign it a genealogy. While there are differences
which uniquely distinguish this moment from past modernisms, as explored by such masters of the
current debate as Frederic Jameson and Ihab Hassan, there are also definite continuities. In this
regard, I perceive such continuities between the later strains of European modernist thought of the
1920s and 1930s (e.g., debates within the Frankfurt School in Germany and debates in and around
the surrealist movement in France), and the current efforts to define a post modernism. For example,
new technologies for reproducing and disseminating works of art as well as claims in aesthetic theory
of the "death of the subject" have deepened the relevance of Walter Benjamin's insights about the
emergent social context and conditioning of artistic production in the late twentieth century, as devel-
oped in his famous 1935 essay, "The Work of Art in the Age of Mechanical Reproduction"; the
writings of Frederic Jameson, among others, and specifically, his focus on parody becoming pastiche,
explore critically the nature of the postmodernist world such tichnologies have shaped. At the same
time, the autonomous work of art, but without the aura of the high bourgeois concept of the individual
artist, as envisioned by Theodor Adorno, has also been developed and identified as symptomatic of
postmodernism; one thinks here, for example, of the work The Critique of Cynical Reason by Peter
Sloterdijk (1983).
31. Frederic Jameson, "Postmodernism and Consumer Society," in The Anti-Aesthetic: Essays on
Postmodern Culture, ed. Hal Foster (1983) and "Postmodernism, or the Cultural Logic of Late
Capitalism," New Left Review, no. 146 (July-August 1984): 53-92.
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But now we need to introduce a new piece into this puzzle, which
may help explain why classical modernism is a thing of the past and
why postmodernism should have taken its place. This new compo-
nent is what is generally called the "death of the subject" or, to say
it in more conventional language, the end of individualism as such.
The great modernisms were, as we have said, predicated on the
invention of a personal, private style, as unmistakable as your finger-
print, as incomparable as your own body. But this means that the
modernist aesthetic is in some way organically linked to the concep-
tion of a unique self and private identity, a unique personality and
individuality, which can be expected to generate its own unique vi-
sion of the world and to forge its own unique, unmistakable style.
Yet today, from any number of distinct perspectives, the social the-
orists, the psychoanalysts, even the linguists, not to speak of us who
work in the area of culture and cultural and formal change, are all
exploring the notion that that kind of individualism and personal
identity is a thing of the past; that the old individual or individualist
"subject" is dead; and that one might even describe the concept of
the unique individual and the theoretical basis of individualism as
ideological ... .2
For Jameson, parody as a stable, artistic practice is very difficult to
sustain in contemporary society. Not only self-conscious parodic works,
but many forms of social communication, become pastiche. This is a result
of the rapidly advancing technologies for the reproduction of all kinds of
signs in a capitalist political economy dominated by modes of production,
exchange, and consumption of signs.
Despite recent criticism of Jameson's somewhat simplistic notions of
parody and pastiche,"3 there is enduring power in his vision of a mass-
media society in which once successful parody rarely comes off any more
because such basic notions of conventional aesthetics as originality, au-
thenticity, genius, and the author have been seriously challenged. It is cer-
tainly pastiche, parody's "dead" form in Jameson's metaphor, that is at
stake in the cases that have defined the parody literature in copyright law.
In contrast to Jameson's seemingly dim outlook for the viability of par-
ody as a reflexive and critical practice of communication under
postmodern conditions, other writers such as Charles Jencks diminish the
importance of pastiche as a contemporary expression of postmodernism."
They find promise in new uses of modernist, and even more classic, liter-
ary practices of parody. Parody is recuperated as a vital practice of artistic
creation in the midst of the mass-media world of rapidly reproducing
images and signs. The critical efficacy of parody is precisely in its reflex-
ivity and dual coding, Jencks argues. Parody remains a distinct work of
32. Jameson, "Postmodernism and Consumer Society," 114-15.
33. See Rose, "Parody/Post-Modernism."
34. Charles Jencks, What Is Post-Modernism? (1986).
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art and, some critics suggest, is the "signature" kind of artistic production
for postmodernism. Yet, parodic works are neither autonomous-they de-
pend for their critical effect on open-ended engagement and dialogue with
other images, texts, and signs-nor do they carry the features of original-
ity, authenticity, and the individual creative author associated with some
modernisms and older bourgeois aesthetics.
So, to fill in the portions of the conceptual space concerning parody
which the discussion of this form of intellectual production in copyright
law does not encompass, we will expand on this distinction between two
kinds of postmodern parody and relate it to the venturesome schemes that
we reviewed for resolving the problem of parody in copyright law.
THE CHALLENGE OF PARODY TO COPYRIGHT LAW'S IDEOLOGICAL
AESTHETIC OF THE GIFT
The two conceptions of parody developed in the lively contemporary
debate about postmodernist aesthetics offer an interesting challenge to the
object of copyright ideology: the high culture work of art, which we have
elaborated as a type of property whose exchange value is defined by a
regime of the gift rather than the commodity. Parody, when conceived in
terms of either of its postmodernist guises, challenges the key concept of
hau, or compulsion to make a return prestation. As we have suggested,
copyright, in modernity, serves as a residual substitute for such a concept.
However, the two postmodernist modes of envisioning parody are quite
different from each other and have very different implications as chal-
lenges to high culture copyright ideology, cast in terms of the work of art
as gift. One mode I call "living," after Jencks and others who see a con-
tinuing vibrant critical function for parody as a genre that has broken the
bounds of literature but still retains its distinctiveness. This "living" mode
challenges the prestige of the autonomous work of art that copyright ideol-
ogy bestows. It does so by emphasizing the primacy of copying (in the
form of parody) as the richest and most valuable kind of creative, artistic
act that is otherwise understood as secondary to the "original." The other
mode, which I call "dead," after Jameson and others who see parody as
devolving into pastiche, a ramifying play of signs without grounding in
specific historical or ethical meanings, more radically challenges the very
idea that a work of art can be conceived in any stable or substantive sense
as a gift. But it does stand the high culture formulation on its head, so to
speak, by demystifying the original, the giving of the gift itself, for the
sake of a focus on the critical vitality of the recipient, in this sense, the
imitator or parody of a supposed original. The other mode sweeps away
the high culture conceit of the work of art as gift able to distinguish itself
from the pervasive economy of sign commodities in contemporary society,
and when presented positively, calls for a new aesthetic based on a total
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world of commodities without the nostalgia for the work of art as residual
gift we find in Hyde. I want to conclude by examining these differences
further.
In its "living" postmodernist guise, parody is a powerful mode of en-
gaged critique that stimulates or extends dialogue with that which it imi-
tates. It is the work of the individual critic, but not in the high culture
sense of bourgeois artistic production. There is no platform permitting the
artist to stand apart from society in ironic contemplation of the subject of
parody, as claimed by earlier modernisms or aesthetics before postmodern-
ism. Instead, the critical power of parody is felt only if it succeeds in
stimulating reactions that enmesh it in further communication with the
object of its criticism or in passing on the spirit (hau) of the original
through the responses of other realms of discourse. The critical component
of parody can thus be seen as the value added, the yield of the original,
the hau or spirit of the gift in Sahlins' interpretation. Parody, as a form of
quotation, while critical, is indeed an homage to the original. Yet its own
power is not in representing the original, but in stimulating further ex-
change, keeping the gift in circulation, so to speak.
But, what the parody cases indicate, even in their obvious commercial
milieu, is that there is no original gift which can respond to the hau of-
fered by parody. Copyright is vested in a market-oriented business; the
original is dead in terms of the regime of the gift. It is only alive as a
commodity whose demand and appeal must be protected by its owners.
This interpretation suggests that parody now stands as the creative act
against an original that has become commodified and completely defined
by market interests rather than being a secondary, derived, and by conno-
tation, less creative work than the original. Two papers that we reviewed
(Bernstein and Bisceglia) seem to acknowledge this in their efforts to up-
grade the artistic import of parody, but they developed no ideological con-
ception of the work of art (e.g. as gift) against which to articulate clearly
and support the standing of parody in their schemes.
Therefore, under postmodern conditions, the act of parody, while evok-
ing its dialogic relation to some original, somewhere, sometime, receives
no response, except in the occasional charge of copyright infringement. In
fact, parody exposes the ideology of copyright, deflating the mythical work
of original art that copyright is designed to protect. It shows that the act
of copying itself, imbued with critical imagination, takes on more of the
character of the individual work of art (but without the aura, since it
cannot be perceived apart from the work it imitates) than the original
work of art, which under postmodern conditions is already the gift-
become-commodity.
An act of parody can also, and usually does, share the fate of com-
modification too, but not without a complex and powerful expression of
the relationships of exchange in artistic production (or the failure of these
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relationships as they are idealized in copyright law). Parody always ori-
ents itself toward a work of art as a gift to which it pays homage, and
part of its critical bite is that it finds the gift wanting. It is not there; it is
dead, transformed, its spirit recreated and carried only by its own parodic
expression. In practical terms, the parody as creative copy makes a
stronger claim, within the framework of the regime of the gift, to an im-
age or expression than the original, imbued with aura in copyright ideol-
ogy. A copyrighted property (or its lawyers) responds to its parodic appro-
priation, a reviving act of (re)creation, not with wit or reason in return,
but with a lawsuit.
In its "dead" postmodernist guise, parody-becoming-pastiche resists a
relation to the original work of art as gift. In fact, it opposes all cultural
stories or narratives, including legal versions, that confer authority on ob-
jects or persons, and constrict possibilities in the flow of signs and mean-
ings. It thus resists the moral tale of the gift, the use of this tale to define
a high culture aesthetics, and by extension, a basic referent for copyright
ideology. It does not pay homage, by satire or laughter, but attempts to
make off with a free gift-one that has no spirit derivable from an origi-
nal and thus does not compel a return. Most subversively, then, it does not
recognize the originality of the original. Being a copy itself, pastiche is the
copy of a copy. In the everyday reception of products of the culture indus-
try, the difference between quotation and stealing becomes indeterminable
and infinitely arguable, as the conversation between two moviegoers, re-
cently reported by New York Times film critic Vincent Canby, shows:
The waves of the future: kidult auteurists. As I walked up the aisle
after the showing of "Die Hard" at the Baronet, I followed two ag-
ing young men in deep discussion about the movie.
"That scene," said the first fellow, full of impatience, "was a di-
rect steal from 'Lethal Weapon.' "
Said his friend, "I hear what you're saying. I admit that.
McTiernan certainly knows that. It was a quote."
Replied the friend, sneering and saying a vulgar word, "You're
out of your mind. It wasn't a quote. McTiernan stole it."
Onwards."5
If the "kidult" viewers of popular movies can't decide, why should the
courts be able to? As we've seen, they can merely exercise their own au-
thority in terms of a particular aesthetic ideology of classic bourgeois and
early modernist auratic art.
Parody-become-pastiche completely undermines the moral economy of
the gift on which the high culture work of art and the notion of author-
ship are based and to which the purpose of copyright ideology is oriented.
35. New York Times, Sunday, 31 July 1988, sec. 2.
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Artistic renderings are not to be seen as a type of statutorily protected
creative expression, but as the free play of signs, where taking meaning
becomes more important than the act of giving it. Unlike the "living"
mode of parody in postmodernism, the authentic creative act in reference
to an originating gift that has become commodified, the "dead" mode of
parody-become-pastiche has little interest in standing alone as a work of
art. It locates itself within a world of simulacra, and as such, builds its
power not by a seminal imitation of an original, but from the recognition
of imitation in a configuration of other imitations. It most radically under-
mines the whole purpose of copyright, and unlike "living" postmodernist
parody, relates less to the print medium of artistic production (where re-
production is relatively controlled) than to the electronic medium of end-
less and rapid reproduction. This view of parody attempts to make a
break with the old morality and aesthetics based on the modern equivalent
of the ideal of the gift, and instead recognizes the predominance of the
processes of commodification and attempts to construct value on those
terms. Pastiche, as contemporary art, embraces commodities in the context
of new technologies of production and dissemination, thus leading writers
like Jameson and Baudrillard to claim pastiche as the aesthetic most com-
mensurate with late capitalist political economy-the aesthetics of adver-
tising, MTV, etc.
This is clearly the sort of postmodernist view that legal discourse is not
prepared to encompass. Even the sympathetic papers that want to enlarge
the legal view of parody do not envision the challenge parody poses to
copyright when it is in its pastiche mode. The parodist, under all circum-
stances, is tamed by having to deal procedurally with the author: the sta-
tus and protection of authorship under copyright deserve first
consideration.
Whereas the "living" mode of parody under postmodernism sustains
the morality of the gift but calls into question the ability of copyright to
relate realistically to authorship and works of art, the dead form of
postmodernist parody, pastiche, challenges radically the terms of copyright
viewed as rights to authors and original works of art. Living parody re-
quires more realism from copyright law; dead parody sees no purpose in
copyright at all-copyright fantasizes relationships, like those of gift ex-
change, that don't exist in processes of artistic production in contemporary
culture, while clearing the way for the routine and expected commodifica-
tion of the intellectual property. The high culture ideal of the gift, a still
powerful and nostalgic ideology of morality in copyright law, keeps such
troubling contemporary constructions of parody out of view, leaving legal
discourse to deal with it instead as the special and controversial case of
fair use that it certainly is.
[Vol. 1: 295
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